Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Volume 20
2015

Mainstreaming Equality in Federal Budgeting: Addressing
Educational Inequities With Regard to the States
Elizabeth K. Hinson
King & Spalding LLP

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl
Part of the Education Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the
Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth K. Hinson, Mainstreaming Equality in Federal Budgeting: Addressing Educational Inequities With
Regard to the States, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 377 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol20/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MAINSTREAMING EQUALITY IN FEDERAL
BUDGETING: ADDRESSING EDUCATIONAL INEQUITIES
WITH REGARD TO THE STATES
Elizabeth K. Hinson*
Great Society reformers targeted poverty as the defining characteristic for a novel
federal education policy in the United States in 1965. Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), reincarnated within the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, distributes financial aid to disadvantaged students within
public schools solely based upon students’ socioeconomic status. This Article does
not dispute that financial resources improve student outcomes, but this Article argues that Title I’s funding formula is ineffective, and a new funding scheme –
specifically, a mainstreaming equality funding scheme – must replace it. The implementation of this funding scheme will require Congress to acknowledge that
poverty in the United States is not a mere set of behaviors and attitudes but is
intricately linked to race and class.
Mainstreaming equality schemes require that public bodies assess the impact
of their policies on equality of opportunity and monitor any adverse impact on the
promotion of equality of opportunity. This Article describes how such a scheme
would address disparities among students. Second, this Article argues that Congress should define beneficiary groups based on characteristics additional to socioeconomic status, including measures of cultural isolation and local tax revenue
contributed to public education. Third, this Article establishes that a federal mainstreaming school funding scheme based on “layered disadvantage” and its multiplicative effects will both acknowledge and address long-time, covered attitudes about
race, poverty and privilege in the United States and the ways in which those
attitudes continue to enforce a paralyzed outcome, especially for African American
students within public schools. Finally, by examining mainstreaming equality
models implemented in the European Union, this Article considers in detail the
methodology for conducting mainstreaming equality within a federal school funding
scheme as implemented by Congress with respect to the individual states.
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INTRODUCTION
Great Society reformers targeted poverty as the defining characteristic for a novel federal education policy in 1965. In declaring the war on
poverty, President Lyndon Johnson insisted that “poverty and ignorance
go hand in hand,” and his economic advisors diagnosed poverty as a set of
particular behaviors and attitudes that would not be eliminated unless
those individuals classified as “poor” fundamentally changed.1 The United
States Commissioner of Education insisted that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) committed the federal government “to end
the paralysis that poverty breeds, a paralysis that is chronic and contagious
and runs on from generation to generation.”2 The Act provided “financial
aid to elementary and secondary schools for compensatory education programs intended to assist poor and educationally disadvantaged children.”3
Lawmakers also believed that schools had become “inflexible, unimaginative bureaucracies” and that the promise of new grants would incentivize
creative adaptation to serving the needs of impoverished students.4
Congress required that ESEA maintain a “balance between federal
power and local responsibility” in order to pass both houses in a postBrown political environment.5 Federal officials may not have been able to
directly control local schools, but they hoped that targeting funds would at
least prod local school officials to address the needs of the poor.6 Yet federal officials underestimated the unwillingness of localities to shift their
1.
Economic Report of the President, Together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers, 15, 77, (Jan. 1964), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1964.pdf. The
1964 Report of the Council of Economic Advisers explained that it would be better to “equip
and permit the poor of the Nation to produce and earn” the income needed for a decent life
than to give them cash since this would “leave untouched most of the roots of poverty.” Id. at
18. See also Margaret Weir, The Federal Government and Unemployment: The Frustration of Policy
Innovation from the New Deal to the Great Society, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 149, 149-90 (Margaret Weir et. al. eds., 1988); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 255 (2nd ed.
1986).
2.
Harvey Kantor, Education, Social Reform, and the State: ESEA and Federal Education
Policy in the 1960s, 100 AM. J. OF EDUC. 47, 49 (1991).
3.
Id. at 65; see also Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10,
§ 301(a), § 303(b)(1)-(8), 79 Stat. 27, 39-41 (1965).
4.
Kantor, supra note 2, at 66.
5.
Kantor, supra note 2, at 69-71. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that desegregation
should occur with “all deliberate speed” through plans developed in federal district courts).
6.
Kantor, supra note 2, at 71.
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priorities no matter the federal incentives.7 Local officials were most concerned with maintaining and developing the core functions of their
schools.8 When pressured to direct ESEA funds to serve disadvantaged students, school districts set up peripheral programs instead.9 Some scholars
have criticized these peripheral programs for fragmenting and stigmatizing
those disadvantaged students ESEA intended to help.10 Congress allowed
for the states to develop procedures for distributing ESEA funds specified
for disadvantaged students, thus designating to states the task of designing
and operating local programs for the disadvantaged.11 Existing local biases
and local politics of education created obstacles to the federal mandates,
and as a result, the rationale behind the war on poverty inevitably failed to
bring about the Act’s desired effects.
As ESEA exists today, reincarnated as the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, the particularized purpose to serve low-income or disadvantaged
students no longer exists.12 Rather, Title I’s stated purpose is to “ensure
that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a
high-quality education.”13 The effect of focusing Title I more broadly on
all children has been to minimize or eliminate the potential Title I had
prior to 2002 to meet the needs of low-income students.14 Of those provisions which resemble the former purpose, Title I now includes a provision
calling for states to coordinate programs that provide services to children
and families to meet comprehensive needs that affect student achievement,
but states only have to do so “to the extent feasible and necessary as determined by the State educational agency.”15 In essence, the provision to state
7.
For example, Kantor describes local officials who, instead of adapting the core functions of their schools to the law, attempted to “comply with the new guidelines” by creating
“separate programs for poor children,” and as a result, also “creat[ed] . . . an independent administrative structure that exerted little pressure on the school to change.” Id.
8.
See Kantor, supra note 2, at 71-72.
9.
Id.
10.
See, e.g., Marshal Smith, Selecting Students and Services for Chapter 1 in FEDERAL AID TO
THE DISADVANTAGED: WHAT FUTURE FOR CHAPTER 1? 119, 128-29 (Denis P. Doyle & Bruce
S. Cooper, eds., 1988).
11.
See Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § Sec. 205(a)(1)(2), § 303(b)(1)-(8), 79 Stat. 27, 30-31, 40-41 (1965). Audits from the program’s earliest years
show this designation sometimes resulted in expropriation. See generally PHYLLIS P. MCCLURE &
RUBY MARTIN, TITLE I OF ESEA: IS IT HELPING POOR CHILDREN? (2nd ed. 1969) (showing
school districts used Title I funds to make capital investments, raise teacher pay, and other general aid instead of helping impoverished students).
12.
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002).
13.
See id. (emphasis added).
14.
See GAIL L. SUNDERMAN & JIMMY KIM, INSPIRING VISION, DISAPPOINTING RESULTS: FOUR STUDIES ON IMPLEMENTING THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 6 (2004), available
at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED489174.pdf (evaluating the law’s unintended consequences for disadvantaged students and already low-performing schools at the local and state
level).
15.
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(9) (2012).
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coordination has little force of its own because even if a state were to have
the resources for such coordination, it would only need to coordinate at its
election.16 Moreover, if schools choose not to coordinate programs, or
otherwise comply with Title I’s requirements, parents of public school students or others aggrieved by such noncompliance have no remedy by
which to compel compliance because Title I provides no private right of
action.17 Instead, if schools do not coordinate programs or fail to carry out
the other requirements of Title I, the United States Department of Education, which can withhold funds from states failing to comply with Title I
requirements, must enforce its provisions.18 Historically, the Department
has rarely elected to exercise this power.19
Components of the Title I funding formula limit the impact of the
targeting provisions. Most of the funds allocated for Title I are allocated to
school districts through the funding formula in Part A of the law.20 The
Title I-A formula consists of four distinct components, each with different
eligibility requirements.21 The Basic Grants component distributes funds
to almost all school districts in the country, whereas the other three components—Concentration Grants, Targeted Assistance Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIGs)—distribute funds only to districts
with somewhat higher concentrations or numbers of low-income children.22 The primary factor used in all the formula components is the number of low-income children residing in each school district.23 Another
important factor is the average state per pupil expenditure, which has the
effect of channeling more dollars per low-income child to districts in states
with high average per pupil expenditure and fewer dollars to districts in
states with low average per pupil expenditure.24 The U.S. Department of
16.

See id.

17.
See Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 269 F. Supp.
2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the NCLB does not reflect the clear and unambiguous intent of Congress to create individually enforceable rights because it does not contain the
necessary rights-creating language; its focus is on children collectively, not individually; and its
enforcement scheme shows an intent for centralized, not individual, enforcement).
18.

See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(2) (2002).

19.
See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932, 947 (2004).
20.

20 U.S.C. §§ 6331-6339 (2002).

21.

See id.

22.

See id. §§ 6334-6337.

23.

See id. § 6333(c).

24.
In calculating the amount of a grant for a local education agency, the statute dictates a
formula to determine the grant amount for which the state is eligible. See id. § 6333(a)(1). This
amount is determined by multiplying the number of qualifying children by “40 percent of the
average per-pupil expenditure in the State, except that the amount . . . shall not be less than 32
percent, or more than 48 percent, of the average per pupil expenditure in the United States.”
See id. While the “per pupil expenditure” factor may be viewed as a means by which Title I
accounts for the cost of education in each state, the per pupil expenditure is more likely a proxy
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Education’s national assessment of Title I, published in 2007, has noted
that the use of average state per pupil expenditures in the Title I formula
may be another factor limiting the impact of the targeting provisions.25
Since many high-poverty districts are in low-spending states, such as Mississippi, Alabama, or Louisiana, the per pupil expenditure factor could
blunt the impact of the targeting provisions.26
The EFIG component of the formula allocates funds first to states,
and then sub-allocates those funds to districts within states.27 While the
sub-allocations to districts are weighted based on concentrations of child
poverty, the initial allocation to the state is not weighted.28 Meaning, the
concentration of these dollars only occurs within states and not among them.
In effect, this component cannot concentrate funds nationally.
In a final illustration of the funding scheme’s limitations, Title I allows school districts to use average salary figures when comparing expenditures among schools and reporting those expenditures to the
government.29 Due to the averaging of costs instead of reflecting the actual
cost of salaries and budgets for each school, there is a transfer of funds from
the less to the more advantaged school districts.30 Further, school districts
divide budgets into portions that can be assigned readily to schools.31 Expenses for teachers and principals are allocated to the individual schools
where those teachers and principals work.32 These expenses “typically
make up more than 80 percent of each school’s allotment.”33 High-poverty schools may appear to receive the same basic education resources as
low-poverty schools within a single school district when in fact they do
not. Some of those monies are diverted to higher-salaried teachers at other
schools because public school budgets do not reflect the actual cost of salafor the individual state’s allocations for education expenditures and income tax structures. See
THOMAS W. FAGAN & NANCY L. KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, TITLE I FUNDS: WHO’S
GAINING, WHO’S LOSING & WHY 7-8 (2004) http://www.cepdc.org/cfcontent_file.cfm?Attach
ment=Fagan_Report_TitleIFunds_060104.pdf.
25.
See STEPHANIE STULLICH, ELIZABETH EISNER & JOSEPH MCCRARY, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF TITLE I: FINAL REPORT, VOLUME I: IMPLEMENTATION 17 (2007). As a result,
those states that spend more dollars on education receive more Title I funds. See FAGAN &
KOBER, supra note 24, at 8.
26.
See FAGAN & KOBER, supra note 24, at 7.
27.
See 20 U.S.C. § 6337(b)-(d).
28.
20 U.S.C. § 6337(b)(1)(B).
29.
20 U.S.C. § 6337(b)(2)(A).
30.
See Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending Inequities Help Some
Schools to Fail, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. POL’Y 201, 212 (2004).
31.
See id. at 204.
32.
See id. at 204-05.
33.
Id.
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ries and budgets.34 In effect, not all federal dollars make it to the children
they were designed to help.35
This Article argues that because the United States has included no
measure on the effects of disadvantages such as race, ethnicity, national
origin, and cultural isolation, and no measure on child poverty, in both the
ESEA and the NCLB Title I funding scheme, the United States has failed
to address educational funding inequities in public schools. More specifically, this Article suggests that if socioeconomic redistribution of target
funds were based on layered disadvantages and patterns of interstate disparities in funding, the outcomes reported in the present-day would likely
reflect the goals of the Title I framers. Students in the United States are
likely to benefit from a mainstreaming equality funding scheme as applied
to the educational funding in Title I, or similar education funding legislation. Mainstreaming equality schemes require that public bodies assess the
impact of their policies on equality of opportunity and monitor any adverse impact on the promotion of equality of opportunity.36
This Article defends the thesis that Congress should implement a
mainstreaming equality scheme as to school funding, define beneficiary
groups based on characteristics additional to socioeconomic status, and
consider interstate disparities, in order to eradicate educational inequities
affecting the most disadvantaged students in the United States. Part I argues that efforts to combat the paralysis of disadvantaged groups have failed
and that regardless of socioeconomic indicators, schools continue to fail
student populations of color, thus making socioeconomic criteria alone
ineffective to counteract inequities. Part II considers methodology for conducting mainstreaming, arguing that the goals and performance indicators
in Title I or similar legislation should be directed towards measuring social
impact and effectiveness among specifically defined groups based on
34.
See id. at 205.
35.
See generally Roza & Hill, supra note 30, at 206-09.
36.
Gender mainstreaming, for example, has received international support as an equity
tool. As a concept, mainstreaming has been around for many years in different capacities but did
not make its debut as a fully-fledged concept until endorsed at the 1995 United Nations Fourth
Conference on Women in Beijing. Since that time, the support for mainstreaming has been
great, particularly at the international level, with the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization
(ILO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) all endorsing its promotion and encouraging its application. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GENDER
MAINSTREAMING: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION OF
GOOD PRACTICES, (1999). See also Christopher McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1696 (1999). In the gender context, Teresa
Rees describes “[t]he essence of the mainstreaming approach” as “seek[ing] to identify . . .
hidden, unrecognized and unremarked ways in which systems and structures are biased in favour
of men, and to redress the balance. It involves lateral thinking to see how apparently genderneutral practices, which appear to offer equal access to all, in fact act as exclusionary mechanisms
for women.” TERESA L. REES, MAINSTREAMING EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EDUCATION, TRAINING AND LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 189 (1998).
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layered disadvantage, which considers race, class, and other factors, and its
multiplicative effects.
I.

TITLE I’S INEFFECTIVE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE

The framers of Title I in 1964 proceeded under the presumption that
financial resources would ultimately improve student academic achievement.37 This Article proceeds under the same presumption. Since the passage of Title I, “[t]he most common baseline for the measurement of
resources is . . . intrastate equity”—that is, an examination of “how expenditures per pupil vary among districts within the same state.”38 However, according to Professor Ryan, there are shortfalls to this method of
measurement: the differences in student needs and in the costs of providing
similar services are two factors that can substantially affect the purchasing
power of an education dollar and should be examined more closely.39
A. Intrastate vs. Interstate Funding Disparities
In evaluating the effectiveness of the Title I funding scheme, it is
important to focus not just on the shortcomings of horizontal equity in
intrastate disparities but also on interstate disparities.40 Interstate disparities
can vary greatly. A 1991 Congressional report on fiscal inequities in the
education of students, stated that the lowest spending district in Mississippi
spent $1,324 per pupil in 1986-87, while in the same year two of the
highest spending districts in New York spent $11,754 and $10,544 per
pupil.41 “In the 1994-95 school year, for example, average per-pupil
spending varied from a low of $3,431 in Utah to a high of $9,136 in New
Jersey.”42 “In a classroom of 25 students, this $5,700 disparity amounts to
37.
See Kantor, supra note 2, at 66-69 (discussing framers’ belief that government funds
could overcome disadvantage and, at the same time, incentivize local school districts to address
the needs of the poorest students, thereby bringing about institutional change in the schools).
38.
James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432,
437 (1999).
39.
Id. (“That a rural district and an urban district have the same funding per pupil may
not be equitable, for example, if it costs more to provide the same services in urban areas and/or
if the urban district has students with more expensive needs.”)
40.
See id. at 437 n.20. In his discussion of school finance reform, Professor Ryan declines
to examine interstate disparities on the basis that school finance reform has “traditionally been a
state-by-state effort” and “little current prospect for increased federal involvement” caused such
focus to be impractical. Id. This author acknowledges the impracticalities of an interstate examination under current legislation, but because this Article specifically advocates for federal intervention in the form of a new federal funding scheme, interstate disparities are at the forefront of
the discussion.
41.
See, e.g., WILLIAM L. TAYLOR & DIANNE M. PICHE, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. &
LABOR, SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: THE IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUITY ON THE EDUCATION
OF STUDENTS AT RISK, H.R. Doc. No. 102-O, at 19-20 (1991).
42.
See Ryan, supra note 38, at 437 n.20.
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$142,500 per class.”43 Twenty years later similar disparities exist. In 2011,
Utah spent only $6,905 per student, the lowest amount in the nation,
while New York spent $16,835 per student and Wyoming spent $19,534
per student, the highest amount in the nation.44 In a classroom of 25 students, this $12,629 disparity amounts to $315,725 per class. The national
average for per-pupil expenditures was $11,864.45
Traditionally, school finance reform has been a state-by-state effort,
with no prospect for increased federal involvement in encouraging or requiring interstate equality. States have at times been encouraged by the
federal government to equalize their own school funding schemes46 but
the incentive provision in the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994
(IASA) was not funded, and Title I has not been fully funded since the
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.47 Ultimately, the federal
government has played no large role in addressing interstate funding disparities. In the case of pre-dominantly minority schools, some spend above
per pupil state average expenditures, yet in many cases, the additional
spending results from Milliken II remedies.48
For those states that have made internal efforts to reform school finance, there has been much to surmount based on the unique histories
and political climates of individual states. For instance, the State of Alabama has faced obstacles ranging from a constitutional amendment which
abolished the state’s guarantee of public education following the Brown
decision to the more recent ruling by the state supreme court in 2002 that
the duty to fund Alabama’s schools rests solely on the state legislature and
“no order of a state court, which requires the disbursement of state funds,
shall be binding on the state or any state official until the order has been
approved by a simple majority of both houses of the Legislature.”49 This
stance reflects the long-time tradition of allowing legislatures to dominate
much of the share of state power in Southern states as well as Alabama’s
reluctance to allow any state court to rule that the state school-funding
scheme is unconstitutional, despite embarrassing disparities.50 More than
43.
Id.
44.
Hajime Mitani, Per-pupil Expenditures Approaching $10,000, Editorial Projects in Education (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.edweek.org/rc/articles/2009/01/21/sow0121.h27.html.
45.
See id.
46.
See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518;
see No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
47.
See David J. Hoff, Debate Grows on True Costs of School Law, EDUC. WK., Feb. 4, 2004,
at 1 (describing protests among state legislatures regarding costs of NCLBA).
48.
See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 267-68 (1977) (specifying a threepart examination by the courts to determine whether de jure racism exists and permitting courts
the right to order a remedy to redress the wrong caused by the de jure racism).
49.
Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002) (citing Amendment 582 of the Alabama Constitution); see also Siegelman v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 819 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 2001).
50.
In 2011, Alabama spent $6,755 on average per pupil, below the national average of
$7,734 – one of the lowest expenditure rates in the nation. In 2011, Alabama spent $8,336 per
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half of the state’s students qualify for free or reduced-price lunches.51 Alabama’s state and local revenues for education are low not only because of
the state’s relatively low wealth, but also because it taxes itself at a lower
rate than all but half a dozen other states.52 The state has also been criticized in a report by the Public Affairs Research Council of Alabama for
the inefficient expenditure of money it does raise because of the state’s
top-down earmarking.53 Alabama channels almost all its revenue from its
major taxes—income and sales—into public education, but the legislature
has nevertheless allocated millions of those dollars for purposes that are not
completely educational in nature.54 When funds fall short for allocation to
local school systems, books and classroom supplies for students and maintenance costs are hit the worst since state law in Alabama prohibits reduction
in public school employee salaries when there is any cut in state funding.55
Alabama is by no means the only state with intrastate funding disparities
and complex obstacles based on local politics, legislative appropriations,
and history. Challenges made by local business leaders, advocacy organizations, and school districts themselves due to intrastate funding disparities
have been launched in the states of Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and others,
with varying outcomes.56
B.

School Funding Litigation

One method of addressing inequities in school finance is litigation.
Most court-ordered desegregation remedies have much to do with funding
inadequacies and reflect principles established in Milliken II.57 After Millipupil, up from $7,609 in the 2005-2006 school year – but still one of the lowest expenditure
rates in the nation. Alabama State Board of Education Report Card 2007-2008, ALA. DEP’T OF
EDUC. 16 (2008), http://www.alsde.edu/general/2007-2008ReportCard.pdf.
51.
Alabama State Board of Education Report Card, supra note 50, at 2 (referring to data from
2006-2008).
52.
See States Ranked by Total State Taxes and Per Capita Amount: 2005, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Dec. 14, 2009), https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/05staxrank.html.
53.
See The Public Affairs Research Council of Alabama, How Alabama’s Taxes Compare,
THE PARCA REPORT No. 37, at 3 (1999), http://parca.samford.edu/PARCA2/reports/
report37.pdf.
54.
Id.
55.
See The Public Affairs Research Council of Alabama, How Alabama’s Taxes Compare,
THE PARCA REPORT No. 46, at 3-4 (2006), http://parca.samford.edu/parca2/reports/
How%20Alabama’s%20Taxes%20Compare%20-%202004%20-%202006.pdf.
56.
See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); DeRolph v. Ohio, 97 Ohio St. 3d (2002); Md. State Board of
Education v. Bradford, 387 Md. 353 (2005); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec, Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480 (1998); Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
57.
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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ken II, the goal of litigation was often to secure funding from the state to
pay for remedial plans designed to improve the quality of facilities and
instruction at racially isolated schools, thus seeking adequacy through remedial funding. However, in 1995, the Court substantially restricted the
power of district courts to order Milliken II-type remedies in Jenkins v.
Missouri.58 Once court-ordered desegregation decrees are lifted, districts
that have been receiving additional funding through court orders will
likely be unable to secure the same level of funding from state legislatures.
In a number of cases, districts and states have entered into agreements
under which the state has agreed to pay the district a substantial sum over a
period of several years in exchange for being released from any further
desegregation obligations.59 Also, opposition from the individual states’
legislatures is all but invited by the court decisions, as George Brown notes,
“[S]tate supreme courts show [a] pattern of expansive declarations of
right and duty coupled with an insistence that solutions must come from
the legislative rather than the judicial branch.”60 That is, “legislative inertia
and unwarranted judicial deference to the political branches in the remedial phase hinder the school finance plaintiff’s prospects for securing a constitutional remedy.”61 Battles in state legislatures, which follow such
typical court decisions, have evidenced a particular pattern for minority
school districts.62 For “minority districts that were successful in court
faced protracted legislative battles that were more intense and longer-lasting than those typically faced by successful white districts.”63 In a case
study on schools in St. Louis, Missouri, Wells and Crain found it implausible that state officials would continue to pump monies into city school
districts after a dismissal of the court order, stating “State and local politicians . . . are on a mission to end the [desegregation] case for political and
economic reasons . . . . Thus, the idea that any state money not spent on
desegregation would be spent on schools, particularly urban schools, seems
58.
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (finding that the district court’s
remedial plan was designed with the purpose of attracting non-minority students from outside
the district and was thus beyond the scope of the court’s remedial authority).
59.
Scott Stephens, Mario G. Ortiz, and April McClellan-Copeland, Judge Lifts Historic
Desegregation Order; Court Control to End in 2000, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 28, 1998, at 1A. See
Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp.2d 705, 757 (N.D. Ohio, 1998) (court declares Cleveland “unitary,”
but rules that state and district funding must fulfill earlier agreement to provide $40 million a year
in extra state funding until the year 2000).
60.
George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State
School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 (1994).
61.
Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1072, 1072 (1991).
62.
See Ryan, supra note 38, at 457-71 (explaining that minority districts that were successful in court faced protracted legislative battles that were more intense than those typically
faced by white or integrated districts).
63.

See id. at 457-58.
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a little farfetched.”64 Despite favorable outcomes where school finance
challenges were won by minority school districts in New Jersey65 and
Texas,66 the local public in each area nevertheless viewed “subsequent legislative reforms in racial terms, regardless of the actual scope and targets of
those reforms.”67 Support of the reforms varied significantly depending on
locals’ racial group identification.68 Wells and Crain also acknowledged the
influence of racial politics over legislative reform in Missouri: “The racial
politics of Missouri, with its mostly white and rural constituents, makes it
difficult for elected officials to fund urban educational programs in the
absence of court orders that say they must.”69 The public’s views on race
are consequently real obstacles to challenging school funding schemes.
Since the passage of Title I, the Supreme Court has held in San
Antonio Independent School District Rodriguez that a rational basis exists for
financing education from local property taxes, namely local control.70 Local control has in some cases been notorious for its inequities, as in Alabama, discussed above, yet nevertheless reflects local dominant political
will. In other states, local control has allowed funding schemes that redistribute wealth, as in Vermont.71 Dissatisfaction with approaches on either
extreme of the spectrum has led to challenges, and parties challenging education financing must pursue actions under state constitutional law. Some
state supreme courts have held their state’s funding schemes to be unconstitutional.72 After Kentucky’s state funding scheme was found to be unconstitutional by the state’s supreme court, Kentucky’s new finance
64.
AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE:
AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 336-337 (1997).
65.

See Abbott V, 153 N.J. 480.

66.

See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391.

67.

Ryan, supra note 38 at 458.

68.

See id.

69.

WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 64, at 114.

70.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

71.
See Ryan, supra note 38, at 467-68. Ryan describes steps taken in Vermont, known as
the “Robin Hood approach,” to be more extensive than efforts by any other state. Under Vermont’s plan, the state ensures that each student receive a little more than $5,000 in funding at a
set tax rate. Localities may tax above the set rate and spend more than $5,000, but wealthier
districts must share additional tax revenues in order to support the plan. For instance, “forty-one
‘gold towns,’ many near ski resorts, will have to share tax revenues with 211 ‘receiving’ towns.”
Id.
72.
See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz.
1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359
(N.J. 1990) (Abbott II); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391; Brigham v. State, 692
A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
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scheme conditioned educational aid on a district’s wealth.73 In Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Educational Reform Act (MERA), like Kentucky’s scheme, was passed in response to the state’s supreme court ruling
that inadequate resources were preventing Massachusetts from meeting its
constitutional duty to prepare its children.74 For school finance, MERA
instituted a new foundation budget for each district.75 The foundation
budget is the total amount of money that the legislature believes a district
needs in order to fund its educational programs, as calculated by a complex
formula.76 Formula factors include payroll, nonsalary expenses, professional development costs, maintenance, books, and equipment.77 Erin E.
Kelly explains the formula as one similar to Kentucky’s funding scheme:
MERA . . . requires a minimum local contribution to the foundation budget to receive state aid. The required contribution
accounts for a municipality’s property wealth and income level.
Once the state determines [that] . . . contribution, [it] subtracts that amount from the foundation budget and funds the
difference. . . .78
Although MERA provides that a district’s foundation budget cannot grow
by more than 4.5% over the preceding year, it does not cap the dollar
amount of revenue that wealthy districts can raise.
In addition, the MERA formula “assumes specific salaries for all personnel and that each district has a 3.5% special education enrollment,” it
also assumes that the cost of books and equipment is the same for each
district.79 Thus, there is no consideration of need within an individual
district or school and in effect, as Kelly points out, no means by which the
73.
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating
the “whole gamut” of the state’s education system, including its financing structure, on the
grounds that it violated equality and equality requirements derived from the state constitution’s
education clause). See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Act. 120
(codified as amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§156.005-446.260 (LexisNexis 2009)); Jacob E. Adams, Jr., Spending School Reform Dollars in Kentucky: Familiar Patterns
and New Programs, But Is This Reform?, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 375, 377
(1994).
74.

See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993)

75.

See MASS. ANN. LAWS

76.

See id., § 2.

77.

Id.

CH.

70, §§ 1, 2 (LexisNexis 2009).

78.
Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable Combination of
Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, DUKE L. J., 411-412 (1995). See also
MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 70 § 3 (LexisNexis 2009).
79.
Kelly at 412 See also MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 70, § 2 (LexisNexis 2009). See generally
Thomas A. Downes & Thomas F. Pogue, Adjusting School Aid Formulas for the Higher Cost of
Educating Disadvantaged Students, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 89 (1994) (discussing the way a formula’s
failure to compensate for cost differentials among districts leads to inadequate state aid).
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state may prioritize assistance to the poorest schools.80 As a result, “the
amount of state aid allotments typically are determined by what wealthy
school districts believe poor districts need.”81
In 2005, MERA was challenged by litigation and the Massachusetts
Supreme Court passed down a ruling that recognized serious remaining
inequities, despite Massachusetts exceeding the national average in education spending per student and its students outranking all other states in the
National Assessment of Educational Progress rankings for reading and
math.82 But ultimately, the court rejected the lower court’s ruling that the
state was still not meeting its constitutional obligations.83 The court also
rejected the lower court’s recommendation that a major costing-out study
should be conducted to determine full adequacy, appearing concerned
that such a study would ignite an endless struggle between the legislature
and the governor over the details of school finance.84
There is no question that each reform scheme implemented in these
states has been imperfect. But despite the shortcomings of its funding
formula discussed above, KERA was touted as a progressive and successful
model for other states.85 Less attention, however, has been paid to the
more recent backsliding: “The increased school funding that started . . . in
the early 1990s was being choked” off by 1995 as “the legislature cut state
taxes by . . . a hefty $150 million annually, eliminating 25 percent of the
increase approved only a few years before.”86 With the recession that began in 2000, Kentucky cut funding,87 as “[t]eacher salaries, which had
80.
81.

See Kelly, supra note 78, at 412.
Kelly, supra note 78, at 414; see JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 213-16 (1991).
82.
See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137–39 (Mass. 2005); see generally Diana Pullin, Ensuring an Adequate Education: Opportunity to Learn, Law, and Social Science, 27
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 83, 96-106 (2007) (discussing the Hancock decision); NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION PROGRESS, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: READING 2005, 14, 16
available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2005/2006451.pdf (among the highest average reading scores for fourth and eighth graders of all states); see NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF EDUCATION PROGRESS, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: MATHEMATICS 2005, 14, 16 available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2005/2006453.pdf (among the highest average math scores for fourth and eighth graders of all states); National Center for Education
Statistics, which is maintained by the U.S. Department of Education and the Common Core of
Data (CCD). In 2005, Massachusetts spent $9,930 per students, and the U.S. average for education spending per student was $8,973. See id.
83.
Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1140.
84.
See id. at 1156-58.
85.
See Ryan, supra note 38, at 466.
86.
PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATTLE FOR ADEQUACY IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS
94 (2003).
87.
See JASON BAILEY, KENTUCKY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, VAST INEQUALITY
IN WEALTH MEANS POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS ARE LESS ABLE TO RELY ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES, (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://www.kypolicy.us/sites/kcep/files/
School%20Property%20Taxes_0.pdf
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been rising toward the national average, began to slip again, and measures
. . . to pay bonuses to teachers willing to work in hard-to-staff schools, to
compensate teacher mentors, and to create an independent standards commission to oversee the state’s . . . schools of education were voted
down.”88 By 2002 Kentucky paid its teachers at 85 percent of the national
average compared to 87 percent of the national average in 1987.89 The
idea of educational adequacy had been woven throughout the 1989 Rose
decision, but as Peter Schrag reports, no one in Kentucky, until the economic downturn of the 2000s, had defined adequacy as it related to the
funding mechanism and fiscal equity.90
In 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled its state’s school funding
system unconstitutional because it treats poor districts inequitably.91 In response, the Kansas Governor signed into law a bill providing additional
monies to poor districts to satisfy the ruling, but the broader question of
whether public schools statewide are sufficiently funded is pending before
a Kansas state court.92
However, no state statutory duty exists to provide funding based on
the adequacy of education as measured by outcomes. Plaintiffs continue to
seek remedies, if not on constitutional grounds, by combing state statutes
for violations of the most basic guidelines provided by the states to school
districts, as exemplified in pending litigation in the State of Michigan regarding the statutory requirement that districts provide remedial assistance
to students who are not performing at grade level in the fourth and seventh grades.93 Political power plays, unwillingness to redistribute funds,
and budgetary cutbacks in hard times substantially limit any commitment
to fund individual state’s school districts equitably with the goal of adequacy for all children. Local state patterns have their own unique circumstances, but the gamble on the educational product offered to any child in
America becomes even more varied when comparing individual states to
each other.
C.

Interstate Funding Disparities

School funding litigation, state supreme court decisions and the subsequent reform efforts by state legislatures indicate the ongoing struggle to
ensure fiscal equity between the poorest and wealthiest districts within individual states. Title I funding formulas also target funds based on the con88.
SHRAG, supra note 86, at 94.
89.
Frederick M. Hess, Adequacy Judgments and School Reform, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS:
THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 159, 181, (Brookings Institution Press,
2007).
90.
SCHRAG, supra note 86, at 94-95.
91.
Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014).
92.
See id. at 1196; see Senate Substitute, H.R. 2506, Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014).
93.
See M.C.L.A § 380.1278(8) (West 2015); see S.S. ex. rel. L.M. v. State, No. 12009231-CZ, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 2148 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2014).
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centration of children living in poverty within specific districts of
individual states.94 However, wide-ranging disparities occur not only between the typical urban and rural districts and wealthier suburban districts95 within states but also in patterns between geographical regions of
the United States. Some regions and states have harnessed local control and
used that local power to deny adequate educations for all children.96 These
local sentiments and political plays are evidenced in the range of funds
appropriated for school districts across the country. This Article will examine more closely those interstate disparities and also focus specifically on
indicators of chronic challenges. Data used in this analysis is from the 2010
school year.
Within the Northeastern region of the United States, several states
have managed to maintain spending at or above the national average for
per pupil expenditures. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont ensured this funding for 100
percent of their students.97 For all seven states designated in this region—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
94.
See 20 U.S.C. § 6333(c)(1)(A) (2012).
95.
See Bruce J. Biddle and David C. Berliner, What Research Says About Unequal Funding
Between Schools, WESTED, 1, 3, http://www.wested.org/online_pubs/pp-03-01.pdf; see, e.g.,
Karen Eppley, Rural Schools and High Quality Teacher Provision of No Child Left Behind: A Critical
Policy Analysis, 24(4) J. RES. IN RURAL EDUC. 1, 2-6, (2009) (considering how high quality
teaching may be achieved and accounted for in rural districts as opposed to urban districts). As
evidenced in the tables in this article, states located in certain geographic regions of the United
States average education expenditures per pupil well below the national average. While it may be
the case the cost of serving a student in some states is less than the cost of serving a student in
others where the cost of living is higher, this Article puts forth the idea that the education
expenditures per pupil also reflects the individual state’s – or, it state legislature’s commitment to
the public education of its citizens. The amount of per pupil expenditures has a direct effect on
the dollar amount of the Title I funding state receives, because the funding formula is tied to the
state’s per pupil expenditures. See supra text accompanying note 24.
96.
See Alabama Accountability Act, H.R. 2013-64, § 8(a)(1),(2), § 9(a)(3), 2013, Reg.
Sess. (Ala. 2013). The Alabama Accountability Act created a refundable tax credit of about
$3,500 for parents transferring children from failing public schools to private schools, diverting
funds from the Alabama State Education Trust Fund to pay the tax credits. See also Kim Chandler, Southern Poverty Law Center Files Lawsuit Challenging Alabama Accountability Act, AL.COM
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/08/southern_poverty_law_center_fi.html.
Where, for example, nonpublic schools in rural areas do not elect to participate in the program,
students attending failing schools have few options and some nonpublic schools could choose not
to accept students from failing schools, further limiting students’ options.
97.
See infra Table I. The data compiled in the Tables found in this Article is from the
National Center for Education Statistics, which is maintained by the U.S. Department of Education and the Common Core of Data (CCD). The CCD is a program of the U.S. Department of
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics that annually collects fiscal and non-fiscal
data about all public schools, public school districts, and state education agencies in the United
States. The data are supplied by state education agency officials and include information that
describes schools and school districts, including name, address, and phone number; descriptive
information about students and staff, including demographics; and fiscal data, including revenues
and current expenditures. See http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ for more information. Data may also be
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Island, and Vermont—the average expense per pupil was about $15,216
dollars.98 The national average of per pupil spending in 2010 was
$11,824.99
In the Mid-Atlantic, the six states of Delaware, Maryland, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia
spent on average about $13,481 dollars per student, still above the national
average of pupil spending.100 In 2010, one hundred percent of students in
Maryland and the District of Columbia attended school in districts where
per-pupil expenditures were at or above the U.S. average, while New
Jersey almost hit the 100 percent mark at 99.9 percent of its students attending such schools.101 Delaware sent about 88 percent of its students to
schools that met the national average for student expenditures.102 Slightly
above 70 percent of students attended such school districts in Virginia, the
same in Pennsylvania and just above 88 percent in West Virginia.103
Midwestern states send fewer students to schools where spending is as
high as in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. The highest percentage of students attending schools in districts where per pupil expenditures are at or
above the national average is in Wisconsin, where the percentage is about
seventy-two percent.104 Illinois ranks next for spending closest to the national average, sending about 66 percent of its students to schools that meet
the national average for student expenditures.105 In Michigan, only about
27 percent of students attend school in districts were student expenditures
are at or above the national average.106 In Ohio, about 43 percent of students attend such schools. Indiana sends about 17 percent of its students.107
All together, the five states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin spend on average about $11,306 per pupil, which places the student
expenditures slightly below the national average in 2010.108
accessed and filtered at “Education Counts Research Center,” EDUCATION WK., available at
http://www.edcounts.org/createtable/step1.php?clear=1.
98.

See infra Table I.

99.
See infra Table I. (showing author’s calculations of averages and analysis of data from
the National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education); see Education
Counts Research Center, supra note 97. Cf. Hajime Mitani, Per Pupil Expenditures Approaching
$10,000, EPE RESEARCH CENTER, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.edweek.org/rc/Articles/2009/
01/21/sow0121.h27.html, (describing national average of per pupil spending in 2009).
100.

See infra Table I.

101.

See infra Table I.

102.

See infra Table I.

103.

See infra Table I.

104.

See infra Table I.

105.

See infra Table I.

106.

See infra Table I.

107.

See infra Table I.

108.

See infra Table I.
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The Southeastern region includes thirteen states, including Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. The
percentage of students in schools spending at or above the national average
drops significantly in these states.109 In Georgia, just 22 percent of students
attend school districts where per pupil expenditures are at or below the
national average.110 Other states’ averages were even less in 2010: Missouri
sent 15 percent of its students to school districts meeting the national average, Texas sent slightly less than 18 percent, South Carolina about 13 percent, Louisiana about 51 percent, and Arkansas about 14 percent.111 North
Carolina managed about seven percent, Kentucky about twelve percent,
Florida about two percent, Alabama about six percent, Oklahoma about
three percent, and Mississippi about three percent.112 In Tennessee, just
over one percent of students attend school in districts spending at or above
the national average. All thirteen states averaged below the national average
at about $9,964,113 with North Carolina averaging the lowest amount of
the thirteen states at $8,713 per pupil.114
The Plains and Mountains region are comprised of the eight states of
Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wyoming. Wyoming sent all of its students to school districts
spending at or above the national expenditures,115 while the other states
averaged sending many fewer students to such schools. North Dakota sent
about 30 percent of its students to schools spending at or above the national average and Montana sent about 27 percent, while Minnesota sent
about 34 percent, and Nebraska about 32 percent.116 Kansas sent about 36
percent of its students, South Dakota sent about 12 percent, Iowa about 12
percent, and Colorado about 7 percent.117 All eight states averaged about
$12,950.118 At the lowest-end, Colorado averaged about $9,306.119
Much further west, Hawaii sent all students to schools meeting the
national average, while Alaska was close behind, sending about ninety-six
percent of its students.120 There is a large difference, however, between
Alaska and Hawaii and the other western states of Arizona, California,
109.

See infra Table I.

110.

See infra Table I.

111.

See infra Table I.

112.

See infra Table I.

113.

See infra Table I.

114.

See infra Table I.

115.

See infra Table I.

116.

See infra Table I.

117.

See infra Table I.

118.

See infra Table I.

119.

See infra Table I.

120.

See infra Table I.
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Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. California
manages to send about 20 percent of its students to schools meeting the
national average in per-pupil expenditures, while Oregon averages 22 percent, and Washington about 27 percent.121 New Mexico sends about 17
percent of its students to schools spending at or above the average, Nevada
sends about five percent, and Idaho sends just about four percent of its
students.122 Arizona meets or exceeds the national average expenditure at
about five percent.123 Together, the states averaged $10,076 per student,124
below the national average. At the high end, Alaska averaged $16,675 per
student, while Utah, spending just $7,042 per student, sat at the very bottom for all states in the nation and sent just one percent of its students to
school districts spending at or above the national average.125
All states categorized as a part of the Southeast and West regions,
with the exception of Alaska and Hawaii, spent below the average per
pupil expenditure.126 On average, states in the Northeast spent the most of
any other region in the country. Alaska, the District of Columbia, Montana and Wyoming all ranked in the top ten, along with six Northeastern
states.127
D.

Chronic Challenge Indicators

High school completion rates, per capita income, and parents’ education levels are just a few indicators of stagnant social circumstances for
populations in some states and in specific urban or even rural areas.128
121.
See infra Table I.
122.
See infra Table I.
123.
See infra Table I.
124.
See infra Table I.
125.
See infra Table I.
126.
See infra Table I.
127.
See infra Table I.
128.
See Selcuk R. Sirin, Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Research, 75 REV. OF EDUC. RES., 417, 417-453 (2005) (conducting a meta-analysis of
studies examining the relationship of socioeconomic status to academic outcomes and showing
that various components of socioeconomic status, including income, parental education, and
parental occupation, have different effects on academic outcomes); see also Vincent J. Roscigno,
Family/School Inequality and African-American/Hispanic Achievement, 47 SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 266,
266-90 (2000) (finding that parental education was a stronger predictor of reading and math
achievement than family income for Black and Hispanic students). See also Inna Altschul, Linking
Socioeconomic Status to the Academic Achievement of Mexican American Youth Through Parent Involvement in Education, 3 J. Soc’y for Soc. Work and Res., 3, 13, 25 (2012). As an example of a more
specific socioeconomic component for a particular racial group, Altschul examined the effects of
paternal and maternal education and occupation separately and those components’ effect on
outcomes for Mexican American and Latino youth. Atschul finds that “in Mexican American
families, maternal occupation had a much stronger positive effect on youth’s achievement than
other measures of SES, and exceeded the effect of income, which had the second largest influence on achievement.” See id. at 25.
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Where the states themselves do not correct these conditions for the population by ensuring educational equity and adequacy, it seems these obstacles might be better tackled by a federal funding policy targeted to mend
those failures in order to achieve greater national consistency.
Statewide graduation rates in 2010 place those states graduating the
fewest students as (starting with the lowest): the District of Columbia (57
percent), New Mexico (59.4 percent), South Carolina (61.5 percent), Nevada (which graduated 62.7 percent of students), Georgia (64 percent),
Mississippi (64.4 percent), Louisiana (67 percent), Arizona (67.2 percent),
Hawaii (67.2 percent), and Alaska (68.7 percent).129
Next in line were Michigan, Utah, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Washington, Arkansas, Florida, New York, California, Delaware,
Oklahoma, Ohio, and West Virginia, all of which produced a graduation
rate of between 70.9 and 74.7 percent.130 Texas, Colorado, Oregon,
South Dakota, Kentucky, Virginia, Wyoming, Illinois, Indiana, New
Hampshire, Maryland, Nebraska, Montana, and Massachusetts graduated
between 74.8 and 79.9 percent of students above the national average.131
Among the most successful states at graduating students were Idaho, Kansas, Tennessee, Minnesota, Maine, Missouri, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Iowa, Wisconsin, North Dakota and Vermont.132
All those states with the lowest graduation rates spent less than the
national average on per pupil expenditures, with the exception of the District of Columbia.133 Six of the ten states with the highest graduation rates
spent above the national average, with the exception of Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, and North Dakota.134 Most of these states sent the majority of
their students to schools spending at or above the national average.135 Average expenditure appears to have had little to no effect, however, in the
rates of graduation between White and Black students in schools, as all
states, on average, are about 1.3 times more likely to graduate White students, sometimes even two times more likely.136 Discrepancies between
129.
See infra Table II.
130.
See infra Table II.
131.
See infra Table II.
132.
Graduation rates for the top thirteen states graduating 80 percent or more of students
were as follows: Idaho (80.0), Kansas (80.0), Tennessee (80.3), Minnesota (80.4), Maine (80.5),
Missouri (80.7), Connecticut (82.2), Pennsylvania (83.0), New Jersey (83.1), Iowa (83.2), Wisconsin (83.7), North Dakota (84.0) and Vermont (85.0). See infra Table II.
133.
See infra Table II.
134.
New Jersey spent $15,384 per pupil; Wisconsin spent $12,607; Minnesota $11,034;
North Dakota $10,885; Connecticut $14,273; Vermont $18,924; Nebraska $13,549; Pennsylvania $13,356; South Dakota $11,859; New Hampshire $14,045. See infra Table II.
135.
See infra Table II.
136.
See infra Table II. For example, in 2010, Maine graduated about 81 percent of White
students and about 26 percent of Black students. Montana graduated about 81 percent of White
students and about 42 percent of Black students. Nebraska graduated about 81 percent of White
students and about 44 percent of Black students. See infra Table II.
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the percentage of White student graduates and Black student graduates
ranged from one percent in Vermont to almost 55 percentage points in
Maine.137 For instance, in Wisconsin, where the state graduated almost 84
percent of all its students, 87 percent of White students graduated in 2010
while just 52 percent of Black students graduated.138 Having graduated
about 80 percent of White students, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Ohio graduated about 50 percent or less of
Black students.139 In states spending less on per pupil expenditures, such as
Georgia and Nevada, where fewer students overall were likely to graduate,
the discrepancy between racial graduation rates was less but still evidenced
a gap.140 In Georgia, about 57 percent of Black students graduated, compared to 71 percent of Whites; in Nevada, just 45 percent of Black students
graduated while 69.1 percent of Whites graduated.141 Those numbers
were more exaggerated where the students were Black males, who graduated at even lower rates, compared to their Black female and White classmates.142 This pattern was true across all fifty states.143 In just a few states
the graduation rate of Black males slightly exceeded the graduation rate of
Hispanic males.144
Of the states with the lowest graduation rates of all students, every
state except Washington ranked below average for the percentage of children with at least one parent with a postsecondary degree.145 In 2010, the
average was 44.6 percent.146 Of those states graduating the most students
in 2010, the majority had about 50 percent or more of children with at
least one parent with a postsecondary degree.147 The majority of students
in every state had a least one parent employed, with the District of Columbia and Mississippi among the lowest.148 In 2010, 61.2 percent of children
in school in the District of Columbia had at least one parent with steady
employment.149 In Mississippi, just 66.1 percent of children had at least
one parent with steady employment. Mississippi also ranked at the bottom
for the total percentage of children living in non-low-income families.150
137.

See infra Table II.

138.

See infra Table II.

139.

See infra Table II.

140.

See infra Table II.

141.

See infra Table II.

142.

See infra Table IV.

143.

See infra Table II.

144.

See infra Table II.

145.

See infra Table III.

146.

See infra Table III.

147.

See infra Table III.

148.

See infra Table III.

149.

See infra Table III.

150.

See infra Table III.
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Just 42.1 percent of children lived in such circumstances in Mississippi in
2010.151 Other states with low graduation rates fell in line not far away:
New Mexico had just 45 percent of children living outside of low-income
families; in South Carolina: 48.9 percent; Nevada: 53.7 percent; District of
Columbia: 48.4 percent; Louisiana: 50.7 percent; and Georgia: 51 percent152—all ranking below the national average of 55.8 percent of
families.153
Evidently, there is no set national standard for funding the education
of a single American student nor is there a national standard for the expected graduation rate, with standards falling much lower for those students of color and for those who grow up in particular regions of the
country. Further, evidence from school funding litigation suggests that
court orders cannot resolve or change minds on the question of transferring monies from students in high-wealth districts within states to lowwealth districts or to school districts with smaller populations of disadvantaged students to those with higher numbers of these students. Legislators
and their constituents are not open to changes as suggested by court systems brought about through school funding litigation.154 In essence, incentives have not surmounted the appeal of local control, even for a goal as
worthy and necessary as serving the most disadvantaged students.
II.

MAINSTREAMING EQUALITY METHODOLOGY

FOR THE

STATES

Current school funding schemes have proven insufficient to achieve
the results intended by the Title I framers, which necessitates an alternative
approach. Outside of the United States, governments have developed
mainstreaming initiatives in the face of stagnant and ineffective anti-discrimination laws and equality policies.155 These initiatives range from providing reports on the impacts of government policies and programs on
women, for example,156 to the creation of a statutory duty imposed on
authorities to ensure that any enactment “be interpreted and administered”
151.
See infra Table III.
152.
See infra Table III.
153.
See infra Table III.
154.
For example, despite a Kansas state court panel ruling in 2014 that the state’s schools
were unconstitutionally underfunded, the Kansas Governor cut public school spending by 1.5
percent in early 2015. John Eligon, School Cash Insufficient in Kansas, State Court Finds, NY
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/us/school-cash-insufficient-inkansas-court-finds-.html; John Eligon, Education is Newest Target of Kansas Budget Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/us/politics/education-is-newesttarget-of-kansas-budget-cuts.html?_r=0.
155.
See Christopher McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1696, 1697-1704 (1999).
156.
See, e.g., Margaret Alston, Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A View from Rural Australia,
18(2) NWSA J. 123, 133 (2006) (discussing the “Women’s Budget,” initially adopted in 1984
adopted by the Victoria, Australia, Office of the Status of Women, requiring federal departments
to report on the amount of money spent on women).
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in accordance with the principle that “material inequalities between certain groups” “be progressively reduced.”157 As Christopher McCrudden
acknowledges, mainstreaming “is a concept subject to varying interpretations,” but “in essence mainstreaming requires that equality be seen as an
integral part of all public policy making and implementation.”158 This
would compel the “‘evaluation of policy processes’ ” and the incorporation
of an “‘equality perspective’ ” “ ‘in all policies at all levels and at all
stages.’”159
A. The Mainstreaming Equality Method
Mainstreaming moves the focus from the results of disadvantage toward its causes. A mainstreaming funding scheme for United States schools
would function to preempt and correct inequity caused by politics or by
the existing financial structures of individual states. The mainstreaming of
school funds should also be allocated based on multiple other indicators of
disadvantage. This approach would go beyond adding one-dimensional
terms like “race/ethnicity” or “social class” to a long list of other variables
and instead assess the effects of policies on specific indicators of disadvantage and look for multiplicative effects. Much like intersectionality,160
which seeks to reveal the effects of interlocking forms of disadvantage, this
approach would address the manner in which racism, class oppression, and
other discriminatory systems create inequalities that structure the relative
positions of children in society. In addition, the approach would require
“questions about deprivation, privilege, discrimination, and aspirations, to
permit characterizing people more fully, and as more than the sum or
product of their parts.”161
Olena Hankivsky summarizes the considerations of policymakers
when thinking about intersectionality in the context of mainstreaming.
She writes that “the mapping of multiple forms of discrimination allows
for the understanding of [for example] gender relations in their specific
context, and . . . their relationship to other structures of inequality such as
class, ethnicity, nationality . . . among others.”162 Abroad, national gov157.
McCrudden, supra note 155, at 1717-18 (discussing PAFT).
158.
Id. at 1699.
159.
Id. at 1703 (quoting RAPPORTEUR GROUP ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND
MEN, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Gender Mainstreaming, 98 GR-EG 1, 6 (Mar. 26, 1998)).
160.
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139.
161.
Nancy Krieger & Sally Zierler, Accounting for Health of Women, 1 CURRENT ISSUES IN
PUB. HEALTH 251, 253 (1995).
162.
Olena Hankivsky, Gender vs. Diversity Mainstreaming: A Preliminary Examination, 38
CANADIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 977, 993-94 (2005). Hankivsky advocates for “diversity mainstreaming,” also building on Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, as an alternative application of
mainstreaming as juxtaposed to an application focused exclusively on gender.
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ernments have utilized both gender mainstreaming and diversity mainstreaming, as discussed by Hankivsky. For example, in Pakistan,
mainstreaming is used to address issues of disability in the Sightsavers’ Lady
Health Workers Programme.163
The original drafters of Title I limited their targeted funds to the
population of children living below the poverty line, as does Title I of the
No Child Left Behind Act, and both attempts lack targeted provisions to
fund on the basis of multiple indicators of disadvantage.164 There is no
doubt that children in the United States who are identified as living in
poverty are more often than not “multiply-burdened” or “multiply-disadvantaged”,165 growing up in predicaments and with particular educational
needs which cannot be represented solely by a caregiver’s income. As discussed in detail above, the educational predicament of a child living in
poverty and the likelihood of that child to experience educational adequacy in his or her lifetime could essentially depend on the very square
mile in which that child resides and the neighborhood school to which she
or he belongs, as allocated funds to the individual school may have less to
do with the number of children living in poverty in attendance and more
to do with the experience levels of the teachers and staff employed there.
Further, the educational predicament of a child in poverty may depend on his or her state’s taxing structure and the whims of legislators to
“earmark” education funds for other purposes. Interstate funding disparities also make it less likely for a child to receive an equitable education if he
or she lives in one of the Southern states or in some states in the Western
United States.166 The child may be more likely to do without essential
supplies or other advantages enjoyed by students elsewhere. Other students
may live in culturally isolated areas, and suffer from an inability to compete. Children of color are much less likely to graduate167 and there is no
consideration of race in current Title I targeted funding. These decreased
odds of graduating exist for children of color in all school districts, no
matter the rate of spending. The likelihood of not graduating is increased
when the students are male, making it imperative that race and gender be
considered together as indicators of disadvantage when allocations are
made to schools in order to ensure educational adequacy for those students.168 This list is most certainly incomplete, but highlights the limitations of the current Title I formulas, which are narrow and normative in
vision. The formula must be adjusted so to address the consequences faced
163.
See Clara Fischer, Intersectional Mainstreaming and Sightsavers’ Lady Health Workers Programme in Pakistan, 20 GENDER AND DEV. 563 (2012).
164.
This approach may also garner greater political will in light of recent decisions regarding affirmative action policies in the U.S. by the Supreme Court.
165.
Crenshaw, supra note 160, at 140, 145.
166.
See discussion supra Sections I.B-C.
167.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
168.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
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by students who are disadvantaged by multiple experiences—such as those
affected by living in a state with one of the lowest tax rates in the country,
in addition to race, gender, and other factors.
B.

Mainstreaming Equality for Disadvantage in Federal School Funding

The processes and approaches to mainstreaming continue to be
played out in practice, and research on best practices is in development.169
Yet some factors have been identified as increasing the effectiveness of a
mainstreaming equality scheme. Following her study of mainstreaming applications in Australia and Northern Ireland, Tahnya Barnett Donaghy
identified four factors as essential to effective implementation of a mainstreaming scheme: political will, a statutory duty to mainstream, allocation
of resources, and methods of enforcement.170 Three other elements have
the potential to undermine the mainstreaming scheme: a hostile government, lack of adequate resources, and lack of a formal requirement, such as
a statutory duty, that policymakers embrace and effect mainstreaming
schemes.171 Political will is essential to the achievement of educational equity and adequacy for all children. Lawmakers must grasp the varied experiences of children in the United States and consider their place of origin,
race, gender, family income-level, family education level, and other situational factors. Lawmakers must recognize that the paralysis that was labeled
as originating from the condition of poverty by politicians in Washington
in 1965 is not just about earnings and income but societal institutions—
some of which are state legislatures themselves that have created systems in
which the educational needs of all children cannot be satisfied. It is difficult
to imagine how a child in a poor county in Alabama, which generates less
than $500 in revenue per pupil,172 can have a chance, not to mention the
odds when that child might be Black and male or fall into any other category indicating educational disadvantage. Funding formulas must not be
based on the experience of the average child but must instead be built from
the experiences of the most disadvantaged child. It is upon this base that
equitable funds and the standard of adequacy must be grounded.
The next challenge for the United States federal government is to
commit funds where fiscal formulas are devised. With the existence of a
statutory duty, this budgeting is more likely to occur. Historically, a lack of
resources has been the main cause of failed efforts to solve funding gaps
169.
See Tahnya Barnett Donaghy, Applications of Mainstreaming in Australia and Northern
Ireland, 25 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 393, 394 (2004).
170.

Id.

171.

Id.

172.
In 2013, Coosa County, Alabama, contributed $407 in local tax revenue to the total
per pupil expenditure for students. Evan Belanger, Map: See Which Alabama School Systems Spend
the Most – And the Least – Educating Your Children, AL.COM (July 18, 2014), http://www.al.com/
news/index.ssf/2014/07/post_13.html.
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between the poorest and wealthiest school districts.173 It is left to policymakers’ imaginations what successes might have been if programs had been
fully funded. Thus, the creation of a duty becomes both the most essential
ingredient and the most essential commitment of the federal government
in establishing a mainstreaming equality scheme for school funding. Current policies that are a part of the No Child Left Behind Act and most
other state funding schemes function as mere policy guidelines. Absent a
formal duty to fund, these guidelines fall short in application. The United
States is susceptible to ideological differences in its party system at the federal, state, and local levels. When considering the politics of local school
districts, it becomes even more apparent that whatever funding scheme is
implemented must be one that will overcome flux and change in both
national and state political leadership and also in local school leadership.
Northern Ireland chose the mainstreaming mechanism embodied in
its Section 75 statutory duty precisely because it would be durable through
different political arrangements.174 Northern Ireland’s statutory duty requires public authorities to regard the need to promote equality of opportunity between: (1) persons of different religious belief, political opinion,
racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation; (2) men and women
generally; (3) persons with a disability and persons without; (4) persons
with dependents and persons without.175 This statutory equality duty has
implications for elementary and secondary education in Northern Ireland,
as it applies to all public authorities, including the Department of Education.176 Each public authority is required to produce an Equality Scheme,
outlining how they will implement Section 75.177 These schemes identify
areas of concern, including those where equality-impact assessments will
occur.178 For example, one such equality-impact assessment reviewing education curriculum found the lack of an explicit requirement to address
racial equality issues in statutory curriculum and those findings were later
factored into the curriculum review, which ultimately informed the content of the new statutory curriculum.179
173.

See Note, Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 61, at 1073-75.

174.
Tanya Barnett Donaghy, “Mainstreaming: Northern Ireland’s participative democratic
approach,” Policy & Politics, 32 (1) (2004), 49-62.
175.
Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 75, Part 1(a)-(d), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/section/75.
176.
See Ombudsman (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, sch. 2, available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/nisi/1996/1298/contents.
177.
See Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 75(4), sch. 9(4), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/schedule/9/paragraph/4.
178.

See id.

179.
See Laura Lundy, Human Rights and Pluralism in Education: Prospects Under Devolution,
in, DEVOLUTION AND PLURALISM IN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25, 31 (Caitlin
Donnelly et. al., eds., 2006).
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A similar delineation of areas for impact assessments would allow for
regular measurements of equity and adequacy for specific groups and for
the effects of interlocking forms of disadvantage. Congress would regularly
assess the effect of policies on layered disadvantage, focusing on the mechanisms and processes that deprive students of advantages otherwise available
to those who are a part of the mainstream. Targeting layered disadvantage
would function similarly to the policy of the New Targeted Social Need
(New TSN) in Northern Ireland, which performs in addition to the mainstreaming equality provisions of Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act of
1998.180 Targeted social need (TSN) has been used in policies throughout
the United Kingdom in order to counteract the divide of resources and
jobs between the regions, as the South is much more prosperous than the
North.181 In efforts to counteract the effects of such a divide, financial
allocations have been budgeted based on indicators such as regional income, employment ratios, health deprivation and disability, education,
skills and training, housing, geographical access to services, and child poverty.182 While such factors may be useful to Congressional assessments and
budgeting formulas, factoring educational disadvantage in the United
States must also encompass circumstances of cultural isolation and the ability to compete.183 Other indicators might include national origin, race,
ethnicity, or gender based on gaps evidenced in assessment outcomes of
these characteristics. Indicators should also consider interstate disparities, as
well as economic stagnation as controlled by local circumstances, whether
in the form of lack of industry, employment, chronic population imprisonment and low education levels. Poverty must not be thought of as a
mere lack of resources, conditions and amenities, as originally defined in
Title I, but also in terms of the extent of deprivation which leads in effect to
people being excluded from mainstream society.

180.

See New TSN Unit, Promoting Social Inclusion: Consultation on Future Priorities BELOFFICE OF THE FIRST MINISTER AND DEPUTY MINISTER (2001), available at http://
www.newtsnni.gov/uk/psi.

FAST:

181.
See Targeting Social Need, in 2 EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY REVIEW: POLICY ASPECTS OF
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 153 (Eithne McLaugh & Padraic Quirk,
eds., 1996), at 153; Rosemary Kilpatrick & Alex Barr, School Exclusions: Reversing the Trend?, in
DEVOLUTION AND PLURALISM IN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 50, 50 (Caitlin Donnelly et. al., eds., 2006).
182.
See generally John Rhodes, Peter Tyler & Angela Brennan, The Single Regeneration
Budget: Final Evaluation, DEP’T OF LAND ECON. (2007), available at http://www.landecon.cam.
ac.uk/research/reuag/uars/projects/urgsrb.htm (measuring the impact of these elements would
include the extent to which a district’s population has been ranked within the top most deprived
in the country, how widespread the high levels of deprivation are within a region, income scale,
meaning the number of income deprived people in the region, and the employment scale, or
unemployment).
183.

See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 267.
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Studies show that there can be no effective enforcement of a mainstreaming scheme without a statutory duty.184 In fact, most mainstreaming
schemes have failed without the provision of an enforcement mechanism.185 Methods of enforcement may include a detailed statutory scheme,
outlining for public authorities specific timelines and guidelines for implementation of the funding scheme and detailed instructions for implementation in related regulations. In addition, the U.S. Department of
Education or other enforcement body, along with a congressional committee, would monitor the implementation of the legislation and its effectiveness. For example, Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998
created the Equality Commission.186 Schedule 9 of the Act outlines the
specific roles of the Equality Commission, specifying that the Commission
is to offer advice on and review the effectiveness of the duties:
The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland shall—
keep under review the effectiveness of the duties imposed by
section 75;
offer advice to public authorities and others in connection with
those duties; and
carry out the functions conferred on it by the following provisions of this Schedule.187
The enforcement body for the U.S. scheme would also report to
Congress in a consultative capacity on the implementation and effects of
the funding scheme. When the enforcement body suspects that a public
authority has not carried out its duty under the statute, it may investigate.188 Congress may also consider employing a consultative element similar to that used in Section 75 as a means by which Congress can accept
recommendations and reports from policy organizations also evaluating the
effectiveness of the funding scheme. Specifically, Paragraph 5 of Section 9
requires:
[b]efore submitting a scheme a public authority shall consult,
in accordance with any directions given by the Commission—
(a) representatives of persons likely to be affected by the
scheme; and
184.

See Donaghy, supra note 169, at 399.

185.

See, e.g., Donaghy, supra note 169 at 405-06 (discussing mainstreaming in Australia).

186.
Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 73, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1998/47/section/73.
187.
Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 75, sch. 9, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/schedule/9.
188.
Id. at §§ 9-10, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/schedule/
9/paragraph/10.
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(b) such other persons as may be specified in the directions.189
Congress may additionally provide a provision of grants to consultative policy groups so that the study of the implementation of the mainstreaming funding scheme across the states may be monitored and
studied.190 This is an essential element in the funding scheme because a
detailed understanding and engagement with all communities is necessary
to ensure all indicators listed within the funding scheme carry the adequate
number of dollars to each student no matter the student’s county or region
in the United States. Moreover, continual assessment and re-assessment of
indicators of disadvantage and evaluations of layered disadvantage will be
required in order to ensure that student needs are adequately met.
Amid wide reports that funds for the federal Title I program have
been insufficient to improve student achievement in identified schools
under the No Child Left Behind Act,191 and the accompanying lawsuits in
various states, it is imperative that Congress commit to a mainstreaming
equality funding scheme for public education. Congress should also consider increasing the amount it already contributes to public education in
order to counteract some of the fiscal inefficiencies at the local level and
the opposition by state taxpayers to allow redistribution of funds between
wealthy and poor school districts. Currently, less than eight percent of
funding for public elementary and secondary education comes from the
federal government.192 In designing a statutory duty for mainstreaming
equality and the consequent allocation of targeted funds, Congress should
prioritize interstate disparities, disbursing federal funds among the states in
order to concentrate funds on a national basis and to combat interstate
disparities. Funds would then also be disbursed according to a new formula
which, unlike the current Title I-A formula, would target funds based on
new definitions of layered disadvantage, as outlined above. The implementation must be effective, and thus the statute must also allow and fund a
sufficient number of staff at the state education agencies to oversee the
implementation of this specialized mainstreaming scheme.
CONCLUSION
Congress required that ESEA maintain a balance between federal
power and local responsibility in order to pass both houses in a post-Brown
political environment. Yet for decades since, this concept of local control
189.
Id. at § 5 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/schedule/9/para
graph/5.
190.
Northern Ireland has provided a similar provision in Section 9 of Schedule 9. See
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/schedule/9/paragraph/9.
191.
See William J. Mathis, The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left Behind Act:
Different Assumptions, Different Answers, 80(2) PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 90, 95-96 (2005).
192.
Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, (Feb. 13, 2012) http://
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html?src=ln, last visited August 1, 2014.
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has undermined the very intent of the Congressional legislation and has at
the same time justified the wide disparities caused by local property taxes.
State high courts that have invalidated property-tax finance systems properly held that expenditure disparities create wealth-based differences in educational opportunities. While the legislative responses to these decisions
have given poor districts more revenue in order to reduce spending variations and enrich educational programs, some of the modified funding formulas do not ensure that substantive change will occur due to other
obstacles at the local level.
Title I’s provision for state coordination to serve disadvantaged populations has little force of its own because even if states have the resources
for such coordination, their participation is at their own election.193 The
statute does not mandate that states receiving Title I funds use those funds
to serve low-income students in specific ways, but rather, the statute permits various uses for the funds and uses general terms such as “provide
services.”194 In many cases, states work at different capacities in terms of
implementing the systems required to enforce the federal legislation.
Again, these frustrations often go to inadequate funding and insufficient
human resources. Due to tensions over local control, other state education
agencies are still reluctant to intrude too much in local schools, even lowperforming ones.195
A new approach is required to combat the paralysis of poverty originally targeted by Title I legislation in 1965. However, the United States
must reevaluate its definition of poverty and acknowledge that poverty in
the United States is intricately linked to disadvantage as it relates to race
and class and other discriminatory systems.196 A federal mainstreaming
193.
See 20 U.S.C. § 6314 (2002) (permitting use of funds for general school population);
20 U.S.C. § 6315 (“may use funds received under this part only for programs that provide services to eligible children”) (emphasis added).
194.

See id.

195.

See generally, Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED:
SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 24, 24-34; 39-40 (William G.
Howell, ed. 2005). When the state takes over a local district, it may be met with ire from the
public, as is the storied case of the emergency manager appointments of Detroit Public Schools.
See Ann Zaniwieski, 4th new leader for DPS; Snyder’s move upsets, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 13,
2015, http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/01/13/dps-gets-newemergency-manager/21697931/. Sometimes local districts contest the extent of their responsibilities as local entities as compared to the state. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651
S.W.2d 90, 93-96 (Ark.1983) (rejecting the rationale of local control as justification for funding
disparities, and holding that the Arkansas system of school funding failed even a rational basis
test); see also Bismarck v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 260–61 (N.D. 1994) (applying intermediate
scrutiny and rejecting the state’s rationale of local control, holding that local control in North
Dakota “is undercut and limited by the legislature’s enactment of requirements for statewide
uniformity of education”).
196.
In Northern Ireland, for example, the government initiated mainstreaming to combat
religious discrimination but has since expanded its mainstreaming scheme to “consider simultaneously age, race, disability, religion, political opinion, marital status, dependent status, and sex-
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equality school funding scheme will create a moral imperative and mission
at the federal level. The funding scheme will contribute the lion’s share of
funding to those schools serving students categorized as disadvantaged.
States will receive weighted funds based on this disadvantage, of which one
consideration would be interstate disparities. To ensure fair interstate disbursement federal funds should be disbursed within states based on each
individual schools’ assessed disadvantage rather than disadvantage by school
district due to the extreme disparities which often exist within districts.
This method will require school districts to change their budgeting methods. Instead of reporting district spending based on district averages and
average per pupil expenditures, school districts will report actual spending
for each school. As a result, targeted federal funds will arrive not at schools
with already rich resources, such as veteran and high-paid teachers, but in
the accounts of the most needy institutions. Through the implementation
of a mainstreaming school funding scheme based on layered disadvantage
and its multiplicative effects, long-time disparities between public schools
in the United States may at last be countered and corrected.

ual orientation at each stage of the policy-making process.” Donaghy, supra note 169, at 395,
398-400.
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TABLE 1
2010

U.S. States
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New York
Rhode Island
Vermont
Regional Average*
Delaware
Maryland
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Virginia
West Virginia
District of Columbia
Regional Average
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
Regional Average
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Regional Average
Colorado
Iowa
Kansas

2010
Percent of students in
districts with per-pupil
expenditures at or above
the U.S. average

2010
Statewide
graduation rate Cumulative
promotion index
(CPI)

100
82.4
99.3
70.2
100
96.1
88

82.2
80.5
79.9
78.3
73.3
71.9
85

87.5
100
99.9
70.6
70.6
88.4
100

73.9
78.6
83.1
83
77.5
74.7
57

66.2
16.7
26.8
43.4
71.5

77.8
78
70.9
74.1
83.7

6.4
14.3
2.4
22
11.8
50.5
2.8
15
7.3
2.6
13.4
1.1
17.7

69.4
72.3
72.9
64
77.2
67
64.4
80.7
71.7
73.9
61.5
80.3
74.8

7.4
11.6
36.1

75.6
83.2
80

Education spending per
student (in U.S. dollars)
NORTHEAST
14273
14914
13507
14045
16239
14571
18924
15210
MID-ATLANTIC
12017
12953
15384
13356
9786
13854
17020
13481
MIDWEST
11372
10672
10700
11719
12067
11306
SOUTHEAST
10166
11275
9572
9606
10139
12341
9756
10747
8713
9430
10073
8831
8882
9964
PLAINS AND MOUNTAINS
9306
11640
11785
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Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Wyoming
Regional Average

11034
14281
13549
13119
11859
18814
12950
WEST
16675
8698
8482
12366
8818
8419
10970
10142
7042
9145
10076
UNITED STATES
11824

Alaska
Arizona
California
Hawaii
Idaho
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Regional Average
Average

[VOL. 20:377

34.4
26.9
32.2
30.1
12.3
100

80.4
79.1
78.8
84
76.3
77.6

96.2
5.1
20.3
100
3.5
4.6
17.4
21.7
1
27.4

68.7
67.2
73.7
67.2
80
62.7
59.4
75.6
71.3
72.1

43.7

74.7

*The “Regional Averages” listed in this table are the author’s calculations based on data available at the
National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. All other data is from the National
Center for Education Statistics. Data may be accessed and filtered at “Education Counts Research Center,”
Education Week, available at http://www.edcounts.org/createtable/step1.php.

TABLE II
2010

2010

2010

2010

U.S. State

Statewide
graduation rate Cumulative
promotion index
(CPI)

Graduation rate
for white
students Cumulative
promotion index
(CPI)

Graduation
rate for black
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

Graduation rate
for Hispanic
students Cumulative
promotion index
(CPI)

Alabama

69.4

75.6

61.7

57.6

Alaska

68.7

73.6

61.2

65.8

Arizona

67.2

67.7

58.9

64.6

Arkansas

72.3

75.9

63

68.9

California

73.7

80.2

56.8

66
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Colorado

75.6

77.1

50.8

61.2

Connecticut

82.2

85.4

61

73.2

Delaware

73.9

76.5

67.8

69.1

District of Columbia

57

99.3

61.9

63.2

Florida

72.9

76.4

70.1

77.1

Georgia

64

71.1

56.5

55.8

Hawaii

67.2

59.4

97.7

31.5

Idaho

80

80.1

61.3

69.2

Illinois

77.8

82

67.6

75.4

Indiana

78

80.9

68.9

67.7

Iowa

83.2

84.9

59.4

66.9

Kansas

80

84.6

62.7

65.3

Kentucky

77.2

79.3

73.7

76.4

Louisiana

67

71.8

59.8

40.4

Maine

80.5

80.9

26.4

— [1]

Maryland

78.6

82.9

66.9

76.7

Massachusetts

79.9

85

68.9

56.4

Michigan

70.9

76.2

50.1

59.1

Minnesota

80.4

84.5

53.9

49.2

Mississippi

64.4

69.5

59.7

59.2

Missouri

80.7

83.2

64.9

68.5

Montana

79.1

80.9

41.6

63.7

Nebraska

78.8

81.1

43.5

72.9

Nevada

62.7

69.1

45

54.9

New Hampshire

78.3

78.3

62.5

37.6

New Jersey

83.1

87.3

66

69.4

New Mexico

59.4

62.2

55.8

54.6

New York

73.3

83.8

72.7

74.8

North Carolina

71.7

81.2

48.4

63.5

North Dakota

84

88.5

81

73.7

Ohio

74.1

80.4

54.3

54.1

Oklahoma

73.9

75.5

53.6

67.3

Oregon

75.6

78

69.8

67.1

Pennsylvania

83

86.4

68.1

65.5

Rhode Island

71.9

74.7

55

58.2
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South Carolina

61.5

67.4

54.3

58.7

South Dakota

76.3

81.3

57.3

65.3

Tennessee

80.3

81.6

74.6

67.4

Texas

74.8

74

61.1

73.3

Utah

71.3

80.2

60

56.7

Vermont

85

84.2

85.2

— [1]

Virginia

77.5

82.4

65.4

77

Washington

72.1

72.9

50.8

55.1

West Virginia

74.7

74.6

69.2

61.5

Wisconsin

83.7

87.4

52.3

63

Wyoming

77.6

80.6

55.7

64.9

U.S. Average
[1] Value not reported
because of insufficient
data for reliable estimate.

74.7

79.6

61.7

68.1

*All data is from the National Center for Education Statistics. Data may be accessed and filtered at
“Education Counts Research Center,” Education Week, available at
http://www.edcounts.org/createtable/step1.php.

TABLE III
2010

2010

2010

U.S. States

Percent of
children who live
in non-low-income
families

Percent of children with
at least one parent with
a postsecondary
degree

Percent of
children with at
least one parent
with steady
employment

Alabama

49.7

39.7

67.8

Alaska

66.9

42.5

68.1

Arizona

48.2

38.4

69.7

Arkansas

45.2

35.2

69.2
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53.7

39.2
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Colorado

61.3

51.5

75.1

Connecticut

71.7

55.4

74.8

Delaware

60.9

42.8

73.1

District of Columbia

48.4

40.4

61.2

Florida

51.6

43.8

70.1

Georgia

51

42.4

70.1

Hawaii

68.1

47.9

75.9

Idaho

51.6

47.8

71.5

Illinois

59.1

47.1

72.3

Indiana

52.7

41.2

70.6

Iowa

63.5

55.2

79

Kansas

57.8

49.8

77.7

Kentucky

51.7

40.2

67.9

Louisiana

50.7

33.8

69.6

Maine

57.6

49.6

71.8

Maryland

70.2

50.9

77.5

Massachusetts

70.5

60.5

72.8

Michigan

55.1

46.8

67.2

Minnesota

66.5

58.1

76.5

Mississippi

42.1

37.5

66.1

Missouri

55.1

44.4

73.1

Montana

55.9

50.8

71.4

Nebraska

58.3

51.6

80.5

Nevada

53.7

32.9

68

New Hampshire

73.5

58.1

79.1

New Jersey

69.6

55.3

75.9

New Mexico

45

34

68.6

New York

58.7

49.6

71.9

North Carolina

51.3

44.5

69.3

North Dakota

65.5

61.5

81.4

Ohio

54.8

45.6

70.4

Oklahoma

48.7

38.3

72.5

Oregon

52.5

42.8

67.2

Pennsylvania

60.5

48.4

72.6
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Rhode Island

60.1

50.6

68.9

South Carolina

48.9

41.2

67.6

South Dakota

57.4

55.8

80

Tennessee

49.7

40.4

67.8

Texas

49.1

36

72.7

Utah

59.2

53.2

78.2

Vermont

60.7

55.9

74.3

Virginia

66.4

52.5

77.5

Washington

60.8

48.1

71.3

West Virginia

51.4

35

68.2

Wisconsin

60.2

50.6

74.5

Wyoming

62.5

50.5

81.9

U.S. Average

55.8

44.6

71.5

*All data is from the National Center for Education Statistics. Data may be accessed and filtered at “Education
Counts Research Center,” Education Week, available at http://www.edcounts.org/createtable/step1.php.
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TABLE IV
2010

2010

2010

2010

HINSON TABLES (DO NOT DELETE)

2010

2010

7/22/2015 4:45 PM

Graduation
Graduation
Graduation
SEASON 201X] Graduation Desktop
Publishing
Examplerate for

Alabama

rate for male
Hispanic
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

rate for male
black
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

rate for
male white
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

female
Hispanic
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

Graduation
rate for
female black
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

Graduation
107

rate for
female white
students Cumulative
promotion
index (CPI)

48.9

54

72.1

51.9

66.5

77.1
78.4

Alaska

64.4

— [1]

71

71.5

65.6

Arizona

60.9

54.3

66

68.4

62.8

69.1

Arkansas

62.3

52.9

73

69.9

69.3

76.4

California

60.8

49.8

77.8

69.9

59.1

82

Colorado

— [1]

49.5

74.7

65.3

52

79.7

Connecticut

— [2]

— [2]

— [2]

— [2]

— [2]

— [2]

Delaware

64.1

68.1

72.3

— [1]

71.9

80.4

District of Columbia

48.9

— [1]

95.2

77.6

— [1]

95.7

Florida

73.7

63.4

73.3

81.2

76.7

79.9

Georgia

48.5

49.8

67.2

57

62.9

75.1

Hawaii

26.1

93.4

59.6

37.6

— [1]

59.3

Idaho

67.6

47.6

77.1

70.3

— [1]

82.9

Illinois

70.9

60.5

80.2

79.8

70.5

83

Indiana

— [1]

58.9

77.2

72.1

71.5

82.9

Iowa

— [1]

51.3

82.8

69.4

— [1]

85.5

Kansas

60.2

55.5

81.8

72.2

63.5

84.6

Kentucky

— [1]

66.9

76.3

78.8

78.9

81.7

Louisiana

34.9

52.5

66.1

34.5

67.2

77.6

Maine

— [1]

— [1]

79.3

— [1]

— [1]

83.6

Maryland

66.1

61.7

80.6

80.3

72.5

85

Massachusetts

50.5

62.6

81.9

59.5

72.5

86.8

Michigan

— [1]

43.5

73.1

— [1]

51.9

79.1

Minnesota

—

— [1]

82.5

— [1]

57.3

86

Mississippi

53.2

50.9

65.7

65.3

67.7

73
84.1

Missouri

— [1]

62.4

81

68.4

69

Montana

— [1]

34.7

79.3

74.6

— [1]

81.1

Nebraska

64.5

32.2

76.7

75

46.3

83.6

Nevada

51.6

41.3

66.3

58.3

47.8

72

New Hampshire

42.8

59

74.9

— [1]

55.9

81.7
87.5

New Jersey

64.5

60.6

85.6

71.2

67.3

New Mexico

49.6

49.2

59.6

57.2

56.1

65.5

New York

73

71.5

83.4

75.8

73.9

86.8
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54.8

43.6

North Dakota

— [1]

Ohio

45.6

Oklahoma
Oregon

[VOL. 20:377

78.1

64.8

53.3

83.8

— [1]

83.9

— [1]

83.5

91.8

45.2

79.4

46.6

54.3

82.1

60.8

45.5

70.7

65.4

58.4

77.6

60.3

68.9

74.7

73

76.6

81.4

Pennsylvania

58.3

62.6

84.9

66.7

74.2

86.9

Rhode Island

52.2

49

70.3

60.5

55.6

78.7

South Carolina

48.2

47.8

63.4

64.2

61.5

72

South Dakota

— [1]

51.4

77.8

84.6

63.4

82.6

Tennessee

63.9

67.9

79.7

— [1]

81.2

83.2

Texas

68.8

57.2

72.3

75.8

64.4

74.9

Utah

51.4

— [1]

76.3

62.5

58.3

83.2

Vermont

43.8

81.1

81.7

— [1]

— [1]

84.2

Virginia

— [1]

58.4

79.2

— [1]

69.1

85.3

Washington

46.1

40.1

68.9

52.8

52.7

75.9

West Virginia

58.1

66.7

71.2

56.1

70.5

77.5

Wisconsin

— [1]

46.3

85.4

65.3

55.9

88

Wyoming

63.9

— [1]

78.2

71.3

— [1]

81.9

U.S.
[1] Value not reported
because of insufficient
data for reliable estimate.

63.3

55.6

77

71.3

66.1

81.6

[2] Value not calculated because necessary data field(s) not reported in the U.S. Department of Education’s Common Core of
Data and not provided by state education agency.

